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The paper studies the relationship between female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) dynamics, social 
expectations and fundamentals across African countries. We show that socioeconomic conditions are overall 
worse in countries where FGM/C is practiced. Yet when we consider the dynamics of FGM/C within 
countries that perform it, there is no clear link between fundamentals and the decline of the practice. We find 
instead that FGM/C dynamics are strongly related to social expectations and social capital. Our findings have 
implications for policy interventions aimed at reducing FGM/C. 
 
The world is rife with collective practices that are harmful, maladaptive and may violate human 
rights. Many of these practices involve women and girls, and a commonly invoked remedy is to 
guarantee them better access to education, health and employment (Toubia and Izett, 1998; 
Harrison, 1997). We focus here on female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C),1 an old practice 
that has been extensively studied.2 Many interventions aiming to reduce or eliminate female 
circumcision have been undertaken and are well documented (WHO, 2008; Shell-Duncan, 2008; 
Innocenti Insight, 2010; UNICEF, 2013; Shell-Duncan et al., 2013). Despite these interventions, 
though FGM/C has been reduced in some countries, it still persists in others and remains 
widespread in about 27 African countries, parts of the Middle East, the African diaspora 
worldwide.  
It is often argued that the causes of the persistence and dynamics of FGM/C can be found in 
the social, political and economic conditions of the countries in which it is practiced (Easton et 
al., 2003; Williams and Sobiesczyk, 1997). Although the importance of economic conditions has 
been downplayed (Gruenbaum, 2001; Shell-Duncan, 2008), there are no studies linking all the 
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1 The term “female genital mutilation/cutting” is used by the World Health Organization to indicate “all procedures 
involving partial or total removal of the female external genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs for 
non-medical reasons” (WHO, 2008).	  
2	  Female circumcision was recognized in 1993 as a human right violation at the World Conference on Human Rights 
and after that various national laws and international resolutions against FGM/C have been adopted.	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socio-economic-political fundamentals to FGM/C dynamics. We show that improvements in 
economic and socio-political conditions are not necessarily associated with a decrease or 
disappearance of FGM/C, especially when such practice is supported by shared social 
expectations. This is the case when FGM/C is a well-established tradition related to gender or 
group identity, to shared beliefs about beauty, health and cleanliness, or is otherwise supported 
by norms of purity, honor and fidelity. An analysis of 13 African countries also found that 
women who have undergone FGM/C are 40% more likely to get married (Wagner, 2013). 
Whenever cutting reflects social interdependencies, social expectations will matter. Such 
expectations can be empirical (what is commonly done) or normative (what the reference group 
believe one should do), and behavioural change is often accompanied by a change in social 
expectations (Bicchieri 2006, 2016).  According to a recent study (UNICEF, 2013), FGM/C in 
most cases is either itself a social norm, or is supported by other norms and values, i.e., those 
who practice it have social expectations that support it.  This view has been questioned by 
Efferson et al. (2015), who show that, in a study conducted in Sudan, cutting rates varied 
between and across communities, concluding that FGM/C cannot be modelled as a coordinating 
equilibrium (a convention).  Though FGM/C may not coordinate marriageability within or across 
some communities, it might still be the case that those who practice it share other norms, beliefs 
and values that support cutting (as Efferson et al. also suggest).  FGM/C may not be a 
coordinating convention, but it is often supported, for those who practice it, by social 
expectations, as our data show.  
This paper provides a comprehensive study of the relationship between economic, political 
and social conditions and FGM/C stability or change over the period 1989 – 2011 across the 27 
African countries in which FGM/C is still practiced.3 In the first part of the paper, we present a 
preliminary and general analysis comparing the political and socio-economic conditions of 
African countries where FGM/C is practiced with those of African countries where it is not 
practiced.  The second part of the paper specifically focuses on FGM/C dynamics in African 
countries where it is still practiced. We analyse the relation between FGM/C dynamics across 
time and the political and socio-economic characteristics of the country. We check whether there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Other authors have analysed the effect of social interactions of FGM/C in Egypt (Naguib, 2012). Of those authors 
that have analysed a larger number of African countries, some have looked at micro-level factors such as reputation 
and identity pressures (Wagner, 2013), others (Bellemare et al., 2015) have used cross-country-year data to explain 
the persistence of FGM/C in a limited number of African countries.	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are differences across countries that experienced increasing, decreasing or stable FGM/C 
between 1989 and 2011. We also examine the relation between FGM/C dynamics and social 
capital and the influence of social expectations about FGM/C on its prevalence across countries. 
The final section of the paper presents a case study. We select four countries as representative of 
those countries where FGM/C has either increased, decreased, remained stable and high or stable 
and low over time. In order to understand the factors that could explain such differences in 
FGM/C dynamics, we analyze the socio-economic conditions, the social expectations 
surrounding the practice, as well as the interventions implemented to eradicate it.  
Our results do not support the common view that greater economic development and 
modernization will lead to the reduction or demise of such traditional practices.  Instead, trust in 
institutions, active social participation and the role of social expectations appear to be major 
drivers of the weakening or elimination of FGM/C. The fact that social expectations, in the 
aggregate, play an important role in the permanence of FGM/C tells us that there are behaviour 
interdependencies. This does not mean FGM/C is a social norm or even a convention: it simply 
means that it is supported by shared values, norms and beliefs that may vary across communities.  
Our results provide suggestions about which policy interventions may be most effective in 
countries that still practice FGM/C.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to present a general and comprehensive 
cross-country evidence on the relation between FGM/C, socio-economic-political data and social 
expectations.   
In the next section we describe the theory and data of FGM/C dynamics. In section 2 we 
highlight the differences between African countries where FGM/C is not practiced and countries 
where it is practiced. Section 3 investigates the differences across African countries that still 
practice FGM/C by their FGM/C dynamics (stability or change), highlighting the importance of 
the relation between social expectations and FGM/C dynamics. Section 4 presents four case 
studies of representative countries that experienced either an increase, decrease, or stable 
high/low FGM/C. Section 5 presents our conclusions. 
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1 Theory and Data 
1.1 Theory of FGM/C Dynamics 
FGM/C is a general term that indicates various circumcision procedures that differ in both 
invasiveness and health risks. The type of practice varies depending on the place and tradition. 
Several reasons are evoked in support of the practice, ranging from tradition, cultural identity, 
cleanliness and beauty, preservation of virginity, preservation from promiscuity, better marriage 
prospects, even religious requirement (UNPF, 2015).  Different individuals and groups may give 
some but not all and not even most of the above listed reasons.  In groups that still extensively 
practice it, FGM/C is often so deeply rooted that everybody is expected to follow it: women must 
undergo FGM/C to be accepted by their community, and their families must support the practice 
to avoid the negative consequences that befall both the uncut girl and her family. It is important 
to note that in any country there may exist groups that practice FGM/C and groups that do not 
(Boyle, 2002; Dorkenoo, 1994). When talking about social expectations and sanctions we always 
refer to individuals and groups that adopt FGM/C. Individual actions and expectations should be 
contextualised accordingly.  
Whether FGM/C is diagnosed as a traditional custom, a convention or a social norm, matters 
to decisions about how to intervene in order to curb the practice (Bicchieri, 2016).4 If FGM/C is 
a custom based on beliefs about health, gender identity or ethnic markers, individual 
interventions aimed at changing such beliefs or providing alternatives might be sufficient. If 
instead FGM/C is a convention or a social norm, it can be modelled as an equilibrium within the 
specific group that practices it. In both a convention and a social norm, individual preferences 
are conditional on the expectations about the behaviour of their reference group (Bicchieri, 
2006). If the practice is a convention, the only expectations that matter to choice are empirical 
ones, i.e. the beliefs about the typical behaviour of one’s reference group. In this case, an 
individual or family may simply want to ‘coordinate’ with the common behaviour of their 
reference group because of a variety of reasons (that may or may not include marriageability 
(Efferson et al., 2015)). If instead the practice is a social norm, empirical expectations are always 
complemented by normative ones, i.e. individuals believe that their reference group expects them 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4For the difference between customs, conventions and social norms see Bicchieri, 2006 chapter 1 and Bicchieri, 2016 chapter 1. 
Briefly, a custom is followed independently of social expectations, a convention is followed because of the presence of relevant 
empirical expectation and a social norm is followed because both empirical and normative expectations are present.	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to behave in a particular way, and might punish them if they do not. In the case of a convention, 
deviating from equilibrium only penalises the deviant. For example, an uncut girl may be seen as 
less beautiful within her extended family or group, but without major social consequences. In 
fact, in many countries families who practice FGM/C and families who do not intermarry. In the 
case of a social norm, the equilibrium is supported by the sanctions that deviations would bring 
about. For example, if FGM/C is related to the importance of virginity and fidelity, an uncut girl 
may be seen as a worse marriage prospect, with serious negative consequences for her and her 
family.  Sanctions are often necessary when deviations from a particular collective behaviour 
create a negative externality, such as with behaviours that symbolize a group’s identity.  In this 
case, FGM/C may relate to a tradition that strongly identifies a specific group or ethnicity.  
If some collective practices are equilibria, then they can only be endogeneously changed 
collectively, since an individual, isolated deviation will face a cost (personal and/or social) and a 
very low probability of success. Once a norm is established in a group, beliefs will be self-
fulfilling and the norm will be self-reinforcing (Bicchieri, 2006), producing social traps (Brock 
and Durlauf, 2001, 2006; Zanella 2007)).  Only when many members of one’s reference group 
change behaviour, the risk of being sanctioned declines and a social norm loosens its grip 
(Bicchieri and Mercier, 2014, Bicchieri, 2016).  A policy aimed at changing social expectations 
is likely, if successful, to lead a society out of a social trap.  
This general theoretical framework is supported by reports and data on FGM/C (UNICEF, 
2013). However, the factors that determine FGM/C dynamics may vary depending on the 
country or region under study. It could well be, for instance, that in some cases FGM/C is more 
of a shared custom than a social norm, while in others it is a social norm proper, in that both 
normative and empirical expectations are present and have a causal influence on behaviour. It is 
important to bear this in mind when interpreting the results. 
1.2 The Data 
The data span from 1989 till 2011, the time range for which we have available data on 
FGM/C. The data are drawn from various data sets. In particular, to obtain time series data for 
FGM/C at the country level, we used the UNICEF 2013 report, the UNICEF country-specific 
2014 reports (that gather information from both the Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey [MICS] 
and the Demographic and Health Surveys [DHS] to obtain FGM/C dynamics over time) and the 
DHS data sets. The DHS data sets are collected from several countries, including African ones, 
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and contain information on demographics and health status of representative samples of women. 
The DHS surveys also collect information on FGM/C of mothers and daughters, the beliefs of 
responders about the practice of FGM/C and the necessity to continue it, and beliefs about why 
FGM/C is still adopted in the country in which the responder is living.  
To get a complete picture of the economic, social and institutional differences across African 
countries that practice FGM/C and African countries that do not, as well as to analyze 
correlations existing between fundamentals and FGM/C dynamics, we used indicators from 
various international data sets. From the World Development Indicators (WDI hereafter), we 
selected the following: agriculture value added, industry value added, manufacturing value added 
and services value added as percentages of GDP, as well as GDP per capita, indicators for female 
education as well as the role of females in tertiary education.  
From the Heritage Foundation, which contains a series of country-specific indicators of the 
level of various freedoms in each country and provides data from 1995 to 2011, we selected two 
indicators: the overall score of freedom in a country and the indicator of freedom from 
corruption. To check for differences in both civil liberties and political rights, we used the two 
indicators from the Freedom House data set. We also used the CIRI data set, which collects 
country-specific indicators measuring socio-political freedoms. The indicators collected from 
this data set are as follows: a measure of physical integrity, empowerment rights index, freedom 
of association and three indicators for women economic, political and social rights. Finally, from 
the PolityIV data set we use the indicators polity2 and polcomp, which measure, respectively, a 
country level of autocracy versus democracy and its degree of political competition.  
To check whether differences in individual freedom exist across the countries under study, we 
collected information from the World Values Survey (WVS hereafter) data set. The WVS is 
made with 6 waves covering the years 1981-1984 (Wave 1), 1989-1993 (Wave 2), 1994-1999 
(Wave 3), 1999-2004 (Wave 4), 2005-2009 (Wave 5) and 2010-2014 (Wave 6). Because 
information on FGM/C is only available since the late 1980s, we only used Waves 2-6. For the 
majority of countries information is available only for the last three waves.  From WVS, we 
select a variable already used by the literature to capture individual autonomy (e.g. Tabellini, 
2010; Bavetta and Navarra, 2012). Details about the construction of the variable are described in 
the Appendix.  
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We also used the Afrobarometer to obtain aggregate social indicators and their evolution 
across countries with FGM/C. This data set is made up of 5 rounds and covers the period 2000-
2011/2013. The Afrobarometer contains several questions on generalized and personalized trust, 
trust in institutions, membership in social groups, and the way women should be treated.  
Finally, the index of ethnic fractionalization is taken from Alesina et al. (2003).  
For some of the data sets, the list of African countries is complete, for other data sets 
(especially survey data), the list of countries is large but incomplete.  However, these country 
lists are representative of countries with FGM/C as well as countries without FGM/C.  Moreover, 
the data are also representative of within-county differences in the practice of FGM/C, i.e., 
countries where the practice is widespread as well as countries where the practice is only adopted 
by a small percentage of individuals.  The overall data, across and within countries, allows to 
draw robust conclusions about the drivers of FGM/C and its dynamics. 
The countries we use in our analysis as well as the variables, their definition and source are 
listed respectively in Table A1 and Table A2 of the Appendix. 
2 Africa: a Comparison of countries with and without FGM/C 
In this section we look at differences in the social, political and economic conditions between 
African countries that practice FGM/C and African countries that do not practice it. We only 
consider cross-country data and do not differentiate the within-country distribution of FGM/C in 
countries that practice it. 
2.1 Macroeconomic and Socio-Political Data 
In Table 1 and 2 we report the descriptive statistics for relevant indicators taken from several 
macroeconomic and socio-political data sets for, respectively, African countries with and without 
FGM/C. The data clearly show that the countries where FGM/C is not practiced are better off 
than countries where FGM/C is a common practice. Countries where FGM/C is practiced have a 
higher value added as percentage of GDP only for the agricultural sector. This indicates that 
countries with FGM/C are more rural and less developed than countries with no FGM/C. The 
indicators for schooling and literacy rate show that in countries where FGM/C is practiced the 
literacy rate of both young and adult females is lower than in countries with no FGM/C. The 
literacy rate of young females is higher than the literacy rate of adult females for both sets of 
countries, indicating that literacy of females is growing over time regardless of whether FGM/C 
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is practiced. In addition, for both sets of countries we found a very small percentage of female 
teachers in tertiary education. Once again the percentage is lower in the countries where FGM/C 
is adopted.  
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Service VA*** 575 43.97 12.64 4.14 82.26
Industry VA*** 575 22.01 10.19 1.88 54.97
Manufacture VA*** 556 8.75 4.61 0.24 22.30
Agriculture VA*** 577 34.80 14.64 3.06 93.98
GDPpc*** 598 502.69 274.29 50.04 1551.25
literacy yF*** 460 50.17 21.33 6.90 96.06
literacy aF*** 471 33.45 17.22 2.29 81.04
TertiaryFemaleTeachers*** 386 12.31 6.77 1.23 43.93
Overall 412 52.91 6.52 26.00 70.19
Freedom Corruption*** 417 24.37 10.56 7.00 70.00
Political Rights*** 617 5.06 1.59 1.00 7.00
Civil Liberties*** 617 4.73 1.30 2.00 7.00
Physical Integrity*** 598 3.87 1.96 0.00 8.00
Empowerment Rights*** 598 6.58 2.99 0.00 14.00
Freedom Association*** 598 0.77 0.72 0.00 2.00
Women's Economic Rights*** 598 0.88 0.50 0.00 2.00
Women's Political Rights*** 598 1.72 0.53 0.00 3.00
Women's Social Rights*** 596 0.68 0.53 0.00 2.00
polity2*** 617 -0.92 4.84 -9.00 8.00
political competition*** 596 5.02 2.73 1.00 10.00
Note : *** indicates ignificance at the 1% according to the Wilcoxon-Mann-Withney test. 
Source : World Development Indicators, Heritage Foundation, Freedom House, CIRI, PolityIV. Years 1989-2011.
Polity IV
Table 1: Fundamentals for African Countries with FGM/C
FGM/C
World Development Indicators
Heritage Foundation Freedom Indexes
Freedom House
CIRI
 
 
With regards to the indicators taken from the Heritage Foundation, Freedom House and the 
CIRI data sets, the countries with or without FGM/C do not significantly differ in terms of 
overall freedom. However, countries with no FGM/C have significantly higher rates of freedom 
from corruption. Protection of both civil liberties and political rights is higher in countries 
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without FGM/C (for these indicators lower values indicate higher freedoms) and the averages are 
significantly different for the two sets of countries.  
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Service VA*** 568 48.99 14.41 3.64 87.76
Industry VA*** 561 33.17 16.79 5.38 80.59
Manufacture VA*** 536 13.24 8.26 1.72 45.67
Agriculture VA*** 561 17.76 13.69 1.16 57.22
GDPpc*** 587 2592.88 2961.06 143.04 15098.62
literacy yF*** 539 82.16 16.65 30.50 99.83
literacy aF*** 535 65.97 17.30 18.93 96.72
TertiaryFemaleTeachers*** 379 24.82 13.10 4.96 55.23
Overall 405 52.55 10.74 21.40 76.30
Freedom Corruption*** 405 31.19 14.73 10.00 70.00
Political Rights*** 598 4.43 2.04 1.00 7.00
Civil Liberties*** 598 4.24 1.55 1.00 7.00
Physical Integrity*** 563 4.39 2.19 0.00 8.00
Empowerment Rights*** 563 7.47 3.61 0.00 14.00
Freedom Association*** 563 1.00 0.82 0.00 2.00
Women's Economic Rights*** 563 1.09 0.52 0.00 3.00
Women's Political Rights*** 563 1.92 0.52 0.00 3.00
Women's Social Rights*** 563 0.80 0.67 0.00 3.00
polity2*** 552 0.54 6.26 -10.00 10.00
political competition*** 552 5.56 3.16 1.00 10.00
Note: *** indicates ignificance at the 1% according to the Wilcoxon-Mann-Withney statistic. 
Source : World Development Indicators, Heritage Foundation, Freedom House, CIRI, PolityIV. Years 1989-2011.
Polity IV
Table 2: Fundamentals for African Countries without FGM
NO FGM/C
Freedom House
World Development Indicators
CIRI
 
 
The social indicators collected from the CIRI data set indicate that physical integrity, 
empowerment rights, freedom of association and women's political economic and social rights 
are higher in countries where FGM/C is not practiced. The result for freedom of association is 
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consistent with the findings of the UNICEF report on FGM/C (UNICEF, 2013), according to 
which FGM/C is a persistent practice wherever individuals do not talk about it and therefore do 
not share their opinions, nor do they have avenues for meeting and sharing their views.  
Finally, the descriptive statistics for the two indicators collected from the Polity IV data set, a 
measure of the degree of democracy versus autocracy and a measure of political competition 
across the two sets of countries, show that, overall, both countries with and without FGM/C 
enjoy a low degree of political competition and low levels of democracy. Yet, once again, on 
average the political framework is slightly better for countries where FGM/C is not practiced 
than for those where FGM/C is practiced. 
The differences in macroeconomic, social and political indicators between the two sets of 
countries are likely to be correlated with individual autonomy. Previous studies and data show 
that in less developed countries (e.g. countries with lower GDP per capita and lower growth 
rates) individuals are less autonomous (Tabellini, 2010). It has been pointed out that lower 
degrees of motivation, more passive attitudes and less perceived self-efficacy (all variables 
related to lower autonomy) can lower individual productivity as well as macroeconomic 
performance (Tabellini, 2010; Bavetta and Navarra, 2012). Moreover, higher levels of autonomy 
have been shown to correlate with higher level of social capital, greater economic development 
and better governance (Tabellini, 2008, 2010).   
To assess autonomy, the WVS asks the following question: “Some people feel they have 
completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has 
no real effect on what happens to them. Please use a ten point scale in which 1 means “none at 
all”, and 10 means “a great deal” to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you have 
over the ways your life turns out.” We derive an indicator (autonomy) taking value 1 if the 
individual chooses a point of the scale greater than 5, and 0 otherwise.  To look for correlations 
between autonomy and social capital, we use the WVS data and compare individual autonomy 
and social capital between the African countries that practice and those that do not practice 
FGM/C.    
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Variable Autonomy FGM_rate trust trustKnown localComm worldCitizen trustOtherN trustOtherR
autonomy 1.00***
FGM_rate -0.14*** 1.00***
trust -0.02*** 0.10*** 1.00***
trustKnown 0.00 0.15*** 0.11*** 1.00***
local_community 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01 0.04*** 1.00***
worldCitizen 0.07*** -0.13*** 0.01** -0.08*** 0.21*** 1.00***
trustOtherN 0.07*** -0.03*** 0.08*** 0.14*** 0.04*** 0.13*** 1.00***
trustOtherR 0.07*** 0.02*** 0.06*** 0.14*** 0.04*** 0.12*** 0.60*** 1.00***
Note : Correlation coefficients are reported. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Table 3: Autonomy, FGM/C and Social Capital Correlations
 
Table 3 reports the correlation coefficients between individual autonomy (autonomy), the rate 
of FGM/C (FGM_rate) in the country and other variables capturing the social capital and 
openness to diversity for each country. The results show that the rate of FGM/C is negatively and 
significantly correlated with individual autonomy. The FGM/C rates (FGM_rate) are positively 
and significantly correlated with the indicators for generalized and personalized trust (trust and 
trustKnown, respectively) and with sociability (localComm). They are negatively correlated with 
individuals' openness (whether one feels to be a citizen of the world and whether one trusts 
individuals from different countries, respectively worldCitizen and trustOtherN).  
Individual autonomy is not only negatively correlated with FGM/C rates; it is also negatively 
correlated with generalized trust and positively correlated with the variables capturing the degree 
of openness and sociability of the individuals (namely, individual feelings of being a citizen of a 
local community or the world, and trust in other nations or religions). Though these correlations 
are mutually consistent, these results may seem prima facie odd.  Greater autonomy should 
positively correlate with more, not less trust (Tabellini, 2010). Yet countries that practice FGM/C 
have low levels of autonomy and high levels of trust. This negative correlation may be due either 
to measurement problems, or to structural characteristics of the country (for example, high 
autonomy combined with high systemic corruption may lead to low trust).   
The data indicate that individuals in countries with FGM/C tend to trust more individuals they 
personally know. Interestingly, the level of generalized trust is also increasing with FGM_rate, 
showing that generalized trust is higher where FGM/C rates are higher. The positive correlation 
between the rate of FGM/C and generalized trust may be explained by the fact that whenever a 
society abides by traditional practices the belief that most other society members also follow the 
tradition makes them trustworthy (unfortunately, there are no surveys measuring such beliefs). 
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Also consider that many areas where FGM/C is practiced are rural, and people rarely move away 
from their villages. In this case generalized trust may refer to the disposition to trust those one 
already knows. The fact that personalized and generalized trust may be confused in these settings 
demonstrates the need for a refinement of trust indicators (Yamagishi, 2011a,b). On the contrary, 
individuals living in countries with no FGM/C tend to see themselves as citizens of the world 
and are more open to individuals of other nationalities than people living in a country practicing 
FGM/C. Those countries, however, are usually characterized by greater urbanization and 
therefore a greater chance of meeting strangers. Interestingly, trust in individuals who practice 
other religions is positively correlated with FGM/C, indicating that the presence of individuals 
with different religious creeds is not a problem across countries that practice FGM/C. This may 
be explained by the presence of ethnic and religious fractionalization within such countries. 
2.2 Autonomy 
We now look at differences in individual autonomy between African countries that do and do 
not practice FGM/C by means of logit models (Table 4). We are aware of possible statistical 
problems (Allison, 1999) in comparing logit coefficients across groups so, as suggested by recent 
work (e.g. Triventi, 2013), we use Average Partial Effects to make such comparison. All the 
regressions include both country dummies and time dummies for waves 2 to 5 (period 1989-
2009), leaving the last wave as a reference (years 2010-2014). Thus, we estimate the following 
equation: 
 𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑋! + 𝛽!𝑓𝑔𝑚!" + 𝜂! + 𝜉! + 𝜀! (1) 
 
where 𝑋! represents individual characteristics (i.e. age, age squared, gender, dummy variables for 
either compulsory or tertiary level of education as maximum level of education obtained, 
dummies for marital status (i.e. single or married) a dummy indicating whether the individual has 
children, dummies for working status (i.e. full-time, part-time worker or self-employed) and the 
size of the city the individual is living in). fgm represents a dummy taking value 1 if the 
individual is living in a country that practices FGM/C and it is both individual (i) and country (c) 
specific; 𝜂!  indicates country dummies and 𝜉!  represents time dummies. autonomy is the 
dependent variable and 𝜀! represents the error term.  
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Dependent Variable: Whole FGM/C NO FGM/C FGM/C FGM/C Men NO FGM/C
autonomy Sample Countries Countries Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
age2 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
gender -0.01 0.01 -0.02***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.008)
eduH 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.05***
(0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015)
eduL -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.09***
(0.009) (0.014) (0.012) (0.019) (0.014) (0.012)
single 0.01 0.07*** -0.01 0.12*** 0.01 -0.01
(0.017) (0.023) (0.021) (0.028) (0.038) (0.025)
married 0.02* 0.05** 0.01 0.08*** 0.01 0.00
(0.013) (0.020) (0.016) (0.025) (0.029) (0.021)
child 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.05*** -0.01 0.00
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.025) (0.020) (0.015)
ft 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014)
pt 0.02* 0.02 0.03* 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.013) (0.024) (0.015) (0.026) (0.034) (0.018)
self-empl 0.03*** 0.03** 0.03* 0.04 0.04** -0.00
(0.010) (0.015) (0.014) (0.024) (0.017) (0.022)
CitySize 0.02** -0.00 0.05*** 0.00 -0.02 0.05**
(0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.022)
fgm -0.21***
(0.040)
country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log pseudo-Likelihood -17,828.09 -8,464.65 -9,325.68 -4,012.93 -4,417.74 -4,721.86
Observations 31,047 14,653 16,394 6,861 7,792 8,139
Source : UNICEF reports (2014) and World Values Survey. Years 1989-2014.
Table 4: Autonomy across African countries
Note : Estimation Method: Logit. Standard errors are robust to the heteroskedasticity and clustered by
region. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
 
 
Model 1 (column 1) analyzes the probability of being an autonomous individual on the whole 
sample of African countries with and without FGM/C. In order to avoid simultaneity the dummy 
	   14	  
for the practice of FGM/C (fgm) is constructed using the period preceding the reference wave of 
the survey. It could be argued that using both the FGM/C dummy variable and the country 
dummies as regressors could be problematic. However, we estimated the model with and without 
the FGM/C dummy and we also estimated a model that only accounts for the FGM/C dummy 
and excludes the country-dummies from the set of regressors. The results are statistically 
invariant, therefore we may conclude that both the sign and the significance of the effect of the 
dummy for FGM/C countries is correctly estimated. 
The results in Model 1 show that individuals living in countries where FGM/C is practiced are 
less likely to be autonomous than individuals living in countries where FGM/C is not practiced. 
In general, individuals with at least some degree of tertiary education are more likely to be 
autonomous than individuals with intermediate education (reference group), while individuals 
with at most a compulsory level of education are significantly less likely to be autonomous than 
individuals with secondary education. Married individuals are more likely to experience a higher 
level of control over their own life than individuals that are neither married nor single (i.e. 
widowed, divorced).  Individuals with a job (either employed full-time, part-time or self-
employed) are overall more likely to be autonomous than individuals belonging to the reference 
category (students, retired, homemakers, unemployed, other). Individuals living in big cities are 
more likely to be autonomous than those living in small cities.  
Models (2) and (3) report the regression results on, respectively, the sample of individuals 
living in a FGM/C country and individuals living in a country without FGM/C. Comparing 
columns 2 and 3, we observe that in both sets of countries individuals with higher (lower) 
education are significantly more (less) autonomous than individuals with intermediate levels of 
education (the reference group). Also, in both sets of countries, full-time or self-employed 
workers are more autonomous than individuals in the reference group (unemployed, students, 
retired, etc.).   
There are, however, a few important differences between the two groups of countries. In 
countries without FGM/C, women are less likely to be autonomous than men, but this is not the 
case in countries with FGM/C.  This may reflect the important role that women play in the 
family in more traditional societies. Where FGM/C is present, married individuals (of both 
sexes) or singles by choice are more autonomous than individuals that are widowed or divorced, 
and this is probably indicative of the importance of marital status in these countries.  
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Comparing women and men living in FGM/C countries (columns (4) and (5) respectively), 
we see that working full time increases the autonomy of both men and women.  However, higher 
levels of education increase the autonomy of men, not of women: this highlights the low 
importance of higher education for women in these countries. Women who are married and have 
children are more autonomous, but marital and parental status do not influence men’s autonomy. 
Overall, the results indicate that individual autonomy of women in countries that practice 
FGM/C is mainly influenced by their marital and parental condition, while higher levels of 
education and self-employment have a positive and significant impact on men's autonomy. This 
is consistent with the fact that in more traditional societies being unmarried or, if married, sterile 
have dire consequences for women. 
Finally, model (6) reports the results for the sample of women living in African countries 
where FGM/C is not practiced. Comparing these results with those of women living in countries 
that practice FGM/C (column 4), we see that in non FGM/C countries higher levels of education 
correspond to higher autonomy. This result indicates that, on average, investing in higher 
education of women in these countries increases their autonomy. Also, marital and parental 
statuses are not relevant to women’s autonomy unlike what happens in FGM/C practicing 
countries. We may conclude that the difference between more traditional countries where 
FGM/C is practiced and those that do not practice it is reflected in women's role in the family 
and society.  
The data show that overall the macroeconomic, social and political conditions of countries 
without FGM/C are better than those of countries where FGM/C is practiced. Countries without 
FGM/C also show a greater level of individual autonomy and a wider set of roles women can 
take in society.  Though our data show that more developed countries are less likely to practice 
FGM/C, we cannot infer that greater development will be accompanied by a reduction of 
FGM/C.  In the next two sections we show that, within countries that practice FGM/C, those 
with better economic/social/political conditions do necessarily have the lowest rate of FGM/C, 
nor better success in curbing this practice over time. 
3 FGM/C Dynamics 
We focus now on African countries where FGM/C is practiced. First, we look at the 
relationship between the rate of FGM/C and socio-economic-political indicators; we then present 
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the correlation between FGM/C rates and social expectations, and conclude with four case 
studies. 
3.1 Fundamentals and FGM/C Dynamics 
Table 5 shows the correlation coefficients between the rate of FGM/C and social, political and 
macroeconomic indicators.5 The 27 countries have been grouped into countries that experienced 
a decrease in the rate of FGM/C between 1989 and 2011 (column 1), countries that experienced 
an increase in FGM/C (column 2) and countries with stable levels of FGM/C (column 3).  
 
Decreasing FGM/C Increasing FGM/C Stable FGM/C
(1) (2) (3)
Variables FGM_rate FGM_rate FGM_rate
FGM_rate 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00***
ServiceVA 0.27*** 0.89*** -0.01
IndustryVA -0.07 -0.32** -0.06
ManufactureVA -0.03 0.84*** -0.27***
AgricultureVA -0.19** 0.10 0.04
GDPpc -0.21*** -0.68*** 0.09
LiteracyYF 0.06 -0.83*** -0.43***
LiteracyAF 0.03 -0.88*** -0.54***
TertiaryFT -0.10 -0.90*** -0.27***
PhysIntegrity -0.35*** 0.66*** 0.07
EmpowerRights -0.29*** 0.80*** -0.07
FreeAssociation 0.02 0.58*** -0.07
WEconomRights 0.13* -0.06 0.16**
WPolRights 0.10 0.59*** -0.35***
WSocRights 0.42*** 0.05 -0.09
PolRights 0.46*** -0.10 0.22***
CivLiberties 0.49*** -0.55*** 0.28***
Polity2 -0.47*** -0.31** -0.13*
PolComp -0.42*** 0.33** -0.29***
OverallFreedom -0.39*** 0.39*** -0.34***
FreedomCorr 0.32** 0.03 -0.09
trust -0.72*** 0.98*** 0.42***
trustKnown 0.28 0.84*** 0.04
Note : Correlation coefficients are reported. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Table 5:  FGM/C and Fundamentals by FGM/C dynamics
Source : UNICEF reports (2014), World Development Indicators, CIRI, PolityIV, Heritage
Foundation, Freedom House and Afrobarometer.Years 1989-2011.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Note that indicators for political rights and civil liberties (PolRights, CivLiberties) are coded from 1 to 7, where 1 
represents highest political rights and civil liberties and 7 the lowest. So a positive correlation indicates a negative 
relationship (see the Appendix).	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As to correlations between FGM/C rates and economic indicators, we must conclude that 
whenever industrialization is increasing, FGM/C is decreasing, probably due to greater 
urbanization.  Wherever GDP per capita increases, there is a tendency to lower FGM/C rates, but 
this is not always the case. Finally, especially for countries with increasing or stable rates of 
FGM/C, when women's literacy and their contribution to education as teachers in tertiary 
education increase, rates of FGM/C decrease.   
The association between FGM/C and social rights (see Appendix for definitions) is not 
univocal. The same can be said for women's social, economic and political rights. There is, 
however, a positive association between political rights and civil liberties and decreasing 
FGM/C. In fact, the table also importantly shows that the higher the rate of democracy, the lower 
the FGM/C rates, meaning that living in a democratic country is negatively associated with the 
practice of FGM/C.  
Finally, when we consider indicators for generalized and personalized trust, increasing 
FGM/C rates are positively correlated with personalized trust (trustKnown), indicating that the 
higher the trust in known people (e.g. family and friends), the higher FGM/C rates. This is 
reasonable, since the higher the trust in family and friends, the less a practice imposed by shared 
traditions is questioned. Moreover, wherever FGM/C is illegal, one must trust family and friends 
not to denounce the family that carries out the practice.   
We also observe that in countries with decreasing FGM/C, the relationship between FGM/C 
and generalized trust (trust) is negative, i.e. as generalized trust increases, FGM/C decreases. 
This relationship instead is a positive and significant one in countries with either increasing or 
stable levels of FGM/C, i.e. as generalized trust increases, FGM/C increases. This paradoxical 
result could be explained by observing that most countries with stable or increasing FGM/C are 
predominantly rural.  Where people do not often move away from their village and have little 
chance of meeting new people, generalized trust may be confused with personalized trust, and 
this is not captured by survey questions.  These results are consistent with findings in section 2, 
where we look at trust across countries that practice/do not practice FGM/C.   
In conclusion, Table 5 shows that, with the exception of a few important variables that have a 
strong and univocal relation with decreasing FGM/C, the FGM/C dynamics is not always 
univocally related to the socio-economic development of a country. 
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3.2 Is Social Capital Relevant? 
In Table 6 we report the overall correlation coefficients between the rates of FGM/C and 
indicators of social capital taken from the Afrobarometer data set.  
 
Variables Labels FGM/C_rate
FGM/C_rate 1.00***
trust 0.21*
trustKnown 0.10
trustPresident -0.14
trustParliament -0.17
trustPolice -0.15
trustCourt -0.42***
trustElecCommiss -0.21**
trustLocalGov -0.15
trustRulParty -0.23**
MemReligiousGr -0.50***
MemCommDev 0.36***
AttCommMeet -0.46***
AttDemo -0.26***
RaiseIssue -0.49***
ContOfficial -0.32***
ContInfluential -0.35***
EmpowerW -0.52***
WTreatedUn(Leader) 0.90***
WTreatedUn(Court/Police) 0.92***
WTreatedUn(Employer) 0.66***
Table 6: FGM/C dynamics and Social Capital
Note : correlation coefficients are reported. *p<0.10,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Source : UNICEF reports (2014) and Afrobarometer. Years
2000-2011.  
 
The first rows of Table 6 confirm what we found in Table 5: rates of FGM/C are higher when 
both generalized and personalized trust are higher.  Rates of FGM/C are lower when trust in 
government institutions (president, parliament, police, courts, electoral commission, local 
government and ruling party), is higher. In particular, the relationship is significant with trust in 
the court of law, trust in the national electoral commission and trust in the ruling party.  Also, 
FGM/rates decrease with membership in religious groups.  This finding is important because the 
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role of religious leaders in fostering abandonment of FGM/C has been often reported (UNICEF, 
2013). Furthermore, while FGM/C rates increase with passive membership in local community 
groups, they decrease with an increase in social involvement and activism. These two results 
indicate that active participation is more beneficial than passive group membership for the 
elimination of bad practices. This is consistent with studies that find different effects of active 
and passive social capital (Beugelsdijk and van Schaik, 2005).  
Finally, the stronger the belief that the government is empowering women, the lower the rate 
of FGM/C. FGM/C rates instead are higher when women are perceived to be unequally treated 
by a leader, an employer or institutions. Thus FGM/C is higher in countries where the perception 
that women receive an unequal treatment is widespread.  
In sum, there are strong and meaningful correlations between the rate of FGM/C in a country and 
the level of social capital, helpful in explaining FGM/C dynamics.	  
3.3 Ethnic Fractionalization and Trust 
Many African countries are characterized by ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et al., 2003). 
We might expect the relation between FGM/C and fractionalization to be negative, as different 
ethnic groups usually have different traditions, and FGM/C might be one of them.  
 
Country Variables FGM_rate EthnicFract trust
FGM_rate 1.00***
EthnicFract         -0.28 1.00***
trust          0.11        -0.25 1.00***
Note : Correlation coefficients are reported. *p<0.10, **p<0.05,
***p<0.01.
Source : UNICEF reports (2014), Alesina et al., 2003 and Afrobarometer.
Years 1989-2011.
Table 7: FGM/C, Ethnic Fractionalization and Trust: Correlations
 
 
In this case, we would expect FGM/C to be lower in more ethically heterogeneous countries.  
Also, we would expect the relation between generalized trust and ethnic fractionalization to be 
negative:  Increasing heterogeneity, combined with strong group identification, may result in 
lower trust across different ethnic groups.  This last consideration is in line with previous 
literature on the subject (Collier and Gunning, 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000, 2002, 2005; 
Bahry et al., 2005; Robinson2013a,b).  Table 7 confirms that ethnic fractionalization and FGM/C 
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rates are negatively correlated, i.e., greater ethnic fractionalization corresponds to lower FGM/C 
rates. Another reason why fractionalization may decrease FGM/C rates is that, in cases where 
FGM/C is not a group identity marker (Shell-Duncan et al., 2011), within-country inter-ethnic 
coexistence may lower FGM/C rates. In Senegal, for example, there can be major variations in 
FGM prevalence among ethnic groups depending on the prevalent ethnicity of the region within 
which they live. (UNPF, 2015). We also find that the correlation between trust and ethnic 
fractionalization is negative. 
3.4 Social Expectations Matter 
Table 8 presents the correlations existing between rates of FGM/C and aggregate beliefs about 
FGM/C across practicing countries. The data for these correlations are taken from the DHS, 
where the women interviewed were asked whether they have been circumcised, their own beliefs 
(attitudes) about this practice, whether men want it to continue, and whether FGM/C is dictated 
by their religion. 
 
Variable circumcision FGM_continue b_Men_cont FGM_req_Rel trust trustKnown
circumcision 1.00***
FGM_continue 0.86*** 1.00***
b_Men_cont 0.91*** 0.98*** 1.00***
FGM_req_Rel 0.90*** 0.94*** 0.93*** 1.00***
trust 0.13 -0.04 -0.30 -0.17 1.00***
trustKnown 0.02 0.12 0.78* 0.38 -0.20 1.00***
Table 8: FGM/C and Beliefs: Correlations
Note : Correlation coefficients are reported. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Source : Demographic Health Surveys with information on FGM/C for available countries and
Afrobarometer.Years 1989-2011.
 
For each country, we computed yearly averages (for each wave) of each variable to track the 
evolution of beliefs and FGM/C dynamics over time. The data are a representative sample of the 
countries practicing FGM/C. The table clearly shows that correlation coefficients between the 
rate of circumcision (circumcision) and the three beliefs (whether FGM/C should continue, if 
men/husbands want it to continue and whether it is required by religion) are large, positive and 
significant. This result is very important because it shows that the actual rate of FGM/C is highly 
correlated with positive beliefs about the practice.  Thus empirical expectations (how frequent 
the practice is), personal beliefs and normative expectations (whether women believe that they 
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are expected by men and/or religion to engage in FGM/C) are important for the continuation of 
this practice. The correlation among the three beliefs is large, positive and strong, indicating that 
women who think that FGM/C should continue are also likely to think that men in general want 
FGM/C to continue and/or that FGM/C is required by religion. In sum, the whole table indicates 
that personal beliefs (attitudes), social expectations and the actual practice of FGM/C are very 
highly correlated. These factors seem to play a much larger role than the social, political and 
economic variables we have analyzed so far. 
Note that these are country-level averages. Thus these results do not imply that – within a 
country or even a community – there is homogeneity of individual beliefs and expectations. Our 
results support the finding that countries with higher FGM/C rates have more favorable beliefs 
(attitudes) and consistent social expectations regarding the practice, but we should not infer from 
the data that FGM/C is a coordination norm. 
4 Case Studies  
We now analyze the relationship existing between FGM/C dynamics, interventions to stop the 
practice and economic-socio-political dynamics by choosing a country from four distinct groups 
(increasing, decreasing, stable/high and stable/low FGM/C). Our goal is to understand why a 
reduction of FGM/C has (has not) been achieved through policy interventions. Finally, using the 
DHS data, we estimate a social interaction model to investigate the impact of both social 
expectations and the practice’s frequency on the probability to undergo circumcision. 
4.1 FGM/C and Fundamentals 
Figure 1 summarizes the socio-economic-political conditions of the four countries (Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Nigeria and Senegal) chosen for our case study. Egypt has an extremely high and stable 
FGM/C rate, Senegal has a stable, low rate, Ethiopia has a decreasing rate, and Nigeria has an 
increasing rate.  We selected indexes that capture economic, social and political freedoms 
enjoyed by the countries. 
Egypt is the country with the highest GDP per capita among the four countries considered,6 
showing that FGM/C does not depend on economic development.  As to socio-political 
indicators, Senegal, followed by Egypt, is the country with the highest average level of overall 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 We report the logarithm of the GDP per capita rather than the GDP per capita for the sake of graphical 
clarity. 
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freedom and freedom from corruption, although the graph shows that the trends for the two 
indicators of freedoms are similar across the four countries, and freedom from corruption is 
declining everywhere.  Senegal has the highest average levels of political competition and 
empowerment rights, but once again no path can be detected between the dynamics of these 
indicators and FGM/C dynamics across the four countries. Finally, Egypt has the lowest average 
level of civil liberties, while Senegal has the highest average level.  
 
Figure 1: FGM/C Dynamics and Fundamentals 
 
Source: WDI, CIRI, PolityIV, Freedom House. Years 1989-2011. 
 
In conclusion, there is no clear, univocal relationship between FGM/C dynamics and 
socioeconomic or political fundamentals, suggesting that FGM/C dynamics depend on other 
factors. 
4.2 Interventions 
In this section we review both legal and policy interventions across the four countries to 
detect the relationship (if any) between them and FGM/C dynamics over time. 
4.2.1 Senegal 
In Senegal the practice varies depending on the region and the ethnicity: according to the 
DHS data, in some regions it is quite widespread (e.g. Kolda and Zuguincho), while in others 
(e.g. Fatick and Louga) it is very low. Overall, the proportion of cutting is around 30% of the 
women population surveyed (UNICEF, 2013). Moreover, about 40 percent of Muslims and 14 
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percent of Christians still practice it. Senegal adopted a criminal law against FGM/C in 1999, 
and anyone who promotes or engages in the practice is subject to punishment, which may 
involve hard labour for life if cutting results in death (Shell-Duncan et al., 2013). Government 
programs aimed at abandoning FGM/C have been promoted since the 1970s, with the help of 
NGOs. However, these interventions have not been promoted homogeneously around the 
country. One successful approach has been implemented by Tostan (Gillespie and Melching, 
2010). This is a community-led, holistic human rights-based program grounded on inclusive 
group discussion of rights, values and life perspectives (Antonazzo, 2003; Bicchieri and Mercier, 
2014).  The Tostan approach has been successful in the abandonment of FGM/C through the 
community-based, shared recognition of human rights (gender equality being one of them) and 
women empowerment. It has also been noted that favouring interethnic marriages in a country 
where the majority of the population does not practice FGM/C has independently helped to 
reduce the practice (Shell-Duncan et al., 2013). 
4.2.2 Egypt 
Egypt is one of the most interesting cases, as it is one of the most developed African 
countries, yet it is also one of the most resistant to abandon FGM/C.7 The practice is a 
widespread  “coming-of-age” tradition. Its endurance is due partly to a specific interpretation of 
the Muslim tradition, partly to the transmission of shared values and customs. Despite the health 
problems caused by FGM/C, it is considered a positive tradition (it is indeed called tahara, 
which means purification) and many women in Egypt are proud of being circumcised. Moreover, 
since the practice is well rooted in society, it is difficult for single families or women to behave 
unconventionally. If a family expects other families in their reference group to practice FGM/C 
and to believe that a family should circumcise its daughters, abandoning the practice can be 
socially costly (Bicchieri 2006, 2016). In Egypt, where family is very important and the head of 
the family is responsible for its members, FGM/C is generally thought as a moral commitment.  
In the last decades, several interventions by the government and various NGOs have 
attempted to eradicate FGM/C in Egypt.8 A law against FGM/C was adopted in 1996 and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Though, as the EDHS data show, FGM/C has recently reduced among cohorts of young women, the overall rate is 
still very high.  
8 See the Innocenti Insights 2010 for a detailed and complete analysis. 
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amended in 2008, when the practice was criminalized. Punishment for violation is relatively 
mild, probably because FGM/C is socially accepted.  
Country-level campaigns have been much less effective than other efforts implemented 
locally. This suggests that social interactions and individual expectations about the behaviour 
and beliefs of members of one’s reference group are important in deciding whether to continue 
or abandon FGM/C. Women and their families may decide to abandon FGM/C when they see 
that people who matter to them abandon the practice, while they are not willing to act against 
FGM/C if they think that, despite media and governmental campaigns, people in their reference 
group will keep practicing it (Bicchieri, 2016).  More studies are needed to understand the 
reasons why the practice is so widespread in one of the most developed African countries. If it is 
strongly supported by social norms of purity and chastity, for example, media and community 
interventions should aim at convincing individuals that purity and chastity can be attained 
without cutting (as Saleema did in Sudan (Bicchieri and Mercier, 2014)), if it is mainly 
religiously motivated, religious leaders should be engaged in the process of change, to name but 
a few interventions that will depend upon a better understanding of the reasons why FGM/C 
persists. 
4.2.3 Ethiopia 
Ethiopia is one of the countries where FGM/C rates are still high, but have declined over time. 
In this country, as in Egypt, chastity (before marriage) and marital fidelity of women are very 
important. This partly explains why FGM/C is still pervasive. However, the practice is declining 
due to the implementation of several policies around the country. The law is very thorough, and 
punishment is severe and can be extended to third parties who promote FGM/C.  
Despite the presence of national laws, interventions against FGM/C have not been planned 
nationwide. Four interventions have taken place in the Amhara Region, the Wolayta Zone, the 
Afar region and the Kembatta region. Despite the fact that community involvement and 
community discussions were adopted in all four regions, a massive abandonment of FGM/C 
occurred only in the Afar and Kembatta regions (Innocenti Insight 2010). It is reported that in the 
Amhara Region individuals started to consider FGM/C as harmful, but this change of attitudes 
did not result in a change in behavior: FGM/C secretly continued and women who did not 
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undergo FGM/C were ridiculed and did not have an easy life in their community.9 In Wolayta 
the result was similar, probably also due to the fact that local facilitators were trained at the 
regional level for a short time, and then were sent to villages to organize collective discussions 
that lasted only a few days. This dismal result could have had other reasons, too. It could for 
example be a consequence of the fact that individuals participating in collective discussions were 
taken from different villages and were later communicating the decision to abandon FGM/C to 
local communities without a previous local discussion. The change in attitudes, if at all sincere, 
was not perceived as shared by one's community. But it could also be the case that there was 
heterogeneity in community attitudes, so that there was a self-selection of those members who 
enlisted as discussion participants.  More research is needed to assess these different reasons, and 
the benefits that communities attribute to cutting. 
Also note that the two latter regions are prevalently Christian Orthodox (Amhara) or 
Protestant (Wolayta), so we cannot say that Islam was among the reasons for the persistence of 
FGM/C.  On the contrary, in the Afar region (a prevalently Muslim region) and in the Kembatta 
Zone (an area with Christian traditions) the whole community was involved in the program. 
Local women and traditional religious leaders were trained as facilitators, and religious leaders 
spread the belief that Islam does not support cutting. These examples show that this practice is 
not mainly a matter of religion, since in Ethiopia a Muslim area abandoned it, but some Christian 
areas did not. The conclusion we can draw is that a “bottom up’ approach based on changing the 
mind of a whole community rather than of single individuals seems to be a successful way to 
fight a well-rooted tradition such as FGM/C in this country. 
4.2.4 Nigeria 
In Nigeria, which is the country where FGM/C is increasing, little has been done so far to 
reduce it.  Local laws were introduced in 1999. Only recently a national law against FGM/C has 
been approved (Violence Against Persons (Prohibition) Act 2015). FGM/C is now prohibited, 
but the punishment is not sufficiently severe to curb the practice. Besides, many studies show 
that the tension between an entrenched practice like FGM/C and a law that runs counter to it is 
not conducive to social change (Stuntz, 2000; Shell-Duncan et al., 2013). In many communities, 
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traditional practices are not persecuted and, even though there exist laws against them, the police 
does not want to interfere with an enduring tradition (Platteau, 2000; Antonazzo, 2003). 
In Nigeria, FGM/C is widespread among Christians; it is also practiced more frequently in 
families with higher education and upper-middle class city dwellers, indicating that this practice 
is considered something to be proud of in a country where gender inequality is still pervasive. 
Few efforts have been done to promote “bottom-up” approaches to address the perpetuation of 
FGM/C (Okeke et al., 2012; Odebode, 2014) and various sources (Immigration and Refugees 
Board of Canada, 2012) report that in Nigeria FGM/C is still practiced because it is supported by 
a variety of social norms, ethnic identity considerations, and status signalling. Odebode (2014) 
argues that although several efforts have been made to eliminate FGM/C in Nigeria, it still 
persists due to an inadequate analysis of the reasons of its permanence, and to the lack of 
programs aimed at changing attitudes as well as social expectations about the frequency and 
approval of the practice.  
4.3 FGM/C Dynamics and Social Interactions 
Since the data show that social expectations are related to the permanence of FGM/C, we 
introduce a social interaction model to test the probability of being circumcised as a function of 
social expectations.  
Taking the findings in Table 8, we estimate the following social interaction model (e.g. Brock 
and Durlauf, 2001), using DHS data, on the whole sample of interviewed women in the four 
countries we analyzed: 
 𝜔! = 𝑐 + 𝛾!𝑋! + 𝛾!𝑌!" + 𝐽𝑚!! + 𝜀! (2) 
 
where 𝜔!    is behaviour of individual i, that is, whether the woman has been circumcised. This is 
a function of a constant (c), individual characteristics 𝑋! (represented here by age, age squared, a 
dummy that takes into account whether the woman is living in a rural or urban area, an indicator 
for education level and a dummy variable taking value 1 if the women is of Islamic religion). 𝑌!" 
indicates contextual-specific variables, represented here by geographic dummies. 𝑚!! is the social 
interaction term, and represents the region-specific rate of circumcision and women’s empirical 
expectations about it (assumed to be correct for each i), as well as normative expectations, i.e. 
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the region-specific women’s second-order belief about whether other women believe that 
FGM/C should continue (assumed to be correct for each i). Finally, 𝜀! is the error term.  
The estimation results are presented in Table 9. The chosen variables capture the essential 
features that may influence the likelihood of being circumcised.  As is conventionally done in 
social interaction models, we assume that individual expectations about average collective 
beliefs about 𝑚! are obtained on the whole sample excluding the interviewed woman. Given the 
large sample, the sample average does not significantly differ from the averages obtained on the 
whole sample. This, together with the assumption of individuals’ self-consistency, allows us to 
assume that individual expectations are equal to the objective probability generated by the 
model.10 Both the average circumcision rates and normative expectations are yearly regional 
averages, for each country and wave.  Regressions contain country dummies. 
 
Dependent Variable: circumcised
(1) (2)
age 0.01*** (0.001)
age2 -0.00*** (0.000)
urban -0.01*** (0.002)
education -0.02*** (0.001)
FGM_continue 0.03*** (0.007)
circumcision 0.61*** (0.004)
Islam 0.07*** (0.003)
Country Dummies
Log pseudolikelihood
Obs
Note : Estimation method: Logit. Column (1) reports the average
partial effects at the mean. Standard errors, in parenthesis and
reported in column (2), are robust to the heteroskedasticity.
Note : Demographic Health Surveys for Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and
Senegal.
Table 9: Regression: Social Interactions Regression Model
4 countries
Yes
-47,811.91
140,528
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  With regard to endogeneity problems (reflection and self-selection), our non-linear model overcomes the 
reflection problem (Manski 1993; Blume et al. 2011). The self-selection problem is usually a relevant one. However, 
in our case we have seen that individual mobility does not significantly decrease FGM/C even in immigrant 
communities. More generally, we can say that solving the self-selection problem would not significantly change our 
results.  
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The estimated model shows that both the regional average rate of circumcision and the 
regional average collective normative expectations about whether circumcision should continue 
have a positive and significant impact on the probability to be circumcised. This result supports 
the findings in Table 8, is valid for all the countries in our sample, and is consistent with our 
regional analyses.  The model also shows that, overall, other variables have an impact on 
FGM/C. Older females are slightly more likely to be circumcised, and this reflects the overall 
tendency to reduce this practice among younger generations.11 Living in an urban area as well as 
having higher education decrease the probability to be circumcised. Furthermore, Muslim 
women are more likely to be circumcised. Regional differences, however, exist on the influence 
of such variables on FGM/C, and we show it running separate regressions.  
We estimate separate models on each of the four countries, to check for differences across 
them (results are available upon request). Regressions show that the impact of age, education and 
social expectations is similar across countries. Instead, the impact of living in an urban area is 
only positive and significant in Egypt, Ethiopia and Nigeria, indicating that women living in 
cities are slightly more likely to be circumcised; the opposite is true for women in Senegal. 
Finally, being a Muslim also shows cross-country variability, negatively affecting the probability 
to be circumcised in Nigeria and positively in the other three countries.  We may conclude that 
while the impact of some variables is region and country-specific, the impact of social 
expectations is pervasive, positive and significant everywhere. This highlights the importance of 
acting on social expectations to reduce FGM/C in countries that still practice it. 
5 Discussion and Conclusions 
Female circumcision is a harmful practice that violates the rights of women and children and 
it is mostly illegally performed around the world. In some communities it may be supported by 
health beliefs or norms of purity and fidelity, in others it may be a necessary prerequisite for 
marriageability; it may represent a traditional custom that signals group identity, or it may mark 
the initiation into womanhood. More research is needed at the local level to assess the drivers of 
FGM/C. Thus, it is extremely difficult to draw a general picture and provide unique suggestions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  In the DHS surveys, interviewed women are asked if they have at least one daughter circumcised, or if they plan 
to circumcise their daughters. We do not use this information because this question is characterized by a high rate of 
item non-response. This may be due to reticence about a practice that is illegal in most countries surveyed. 	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to policy-makers. However, whatever the drivers might be, we showed that social expectations 
play a crucial role in supporting the continuation of this practice. This tells us that there are 
behaviour interdependencies. Whether or not such interdependencies signal the presence of a 
social norm, and what the nature of such norm might be (marriageability, honour, purity, group 
identity, etc.) are beyond the scope of this study.   
The goal of this paper has been to present a complete and general analysis of the relation 
between FGM/C dynamics and the economic, social and political conditions across African 
countries. The data show that, overall, economic/political/social conditions of countries that do 
not practice FGM/C are much better than those of countries that do, and that individuals living in 
countries practicing FGM/C experience a lower degree of autonomy than individuals living in 
countries where FGM/C is absent.   
When we look closely at the differences across countries that practice FGM/C, we find that 
there exists a weak, non-univocal relationships between economic/social/political development 
and the rate at which FGM/C is practiced. We also find that this rate decreases with increasing 
trust in institutions and active social participation. The rate of FGM/C increases with the degree 
of women discrimination, and it is also higher the stronger the social expectations supporting it. 
Finally, though many countries that practice FGM/C are prevalently Islamic, we found no strong 
link between Islam and female cutting.  Our conclusion is that practices as traditional as FGM/C 
are not that sensitive to changes in fundamentals.  
The case studies we report show that bottom-up approaches, aimed at changing beliefs, 
attitudes and/or values directly or indirectly involving FGM/C can be very effective in reducing 
the practice. The attempts made by AMREF in Kenya (AMREF, 2014a,b), which proposes 
alternative rites of passage (ARP) to eradicate FGM/C and improve health and education of girls, 
are a good example of such bottom-up approaches. Mass media (radio, tv and soap operas) could 
also be helpful in changing individual beliefs and attitudes (Bicchieri and McNally, 2015; Della 
Vigna and La Ferrara, 2015; La Ferrara, 2015; La Ferrara et al., 2012). If there are 
interdependencies, these interventions will inevitably also change social expectations, 
reinforcing the effects of beliefs, attitudes and/or values change. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1 reports the countries object of the analysis, whether FGM/C is practiced in each 
country and, for countries that practice it, its dynamics. 
Table A.2 lists the variables used in the paper, their definition, the source and the variables 
from which they have been obtained. 
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Country FGM/C FGM/C Dynamics Country FGM/C
Benin y Decreasing Algeria n
Burkina Faso y Increasing Angola n
Cameroon y Stable (low) Botswana n
Central African Republic y Decreasing Burundi n
Chad y Stable (high) Cape Verde n
Cote d'Ivoire y Decreasing Comoros n
Djibouti y Stable (high) Congo, Dem. Rep. n
Egypt y Stable (high) Congo, Rep. of n
Eritrea y Decreasing Equatorial Guinea n
Ethiopia y Decreasing Gabon n
Gambia y Stable (high) Lesotho n
Ghana y Stable (low) Libya n
Guinea y Stable (high) Madagascar n
Guinea-Bissau y Increasing Malawi n
Kenya y Decreasing Mauritius n
Liberia y Stable (high) Morocco n
Mali y Stable (high) Mozambique n
Mauritania y Stable (high) Namibia n
Niger y Decreasing Rwanda n
Nigeria y Increasing Sao Tome and Principe n
Senegal y Stable (low) Seychelles n
Sierra Leone y Stable (high) South Africa n
Somalia y Stable (high) Swaziland n
Sudan y Stable (high) Tunisia n
Tanzania y Decreasing Zambia n
Togo y Decreasing Zimbabwe n
Uganda y Stable (low)
Note : y indicates that the country practices FGM/C, n that it does not practice it.
Table A.1: List of Countries
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Variable Definition Source
circumcised dummy variable taking value 1 if the
woman is circumcised, 0 otherwise
Demographic Health Survey
(DHS), variables (v.): s801,
s802, s901, s902, s821,
g102, fg103, v902, s1001,
s1002, s1003, s229, s521,
s551, s552, g102, s631f
circumcision regional percentage of women that have 
been circumcised
DHS, v.: see circumcised
FGM_continue regional percentage of women that think
that FGM/C should continue
DHS, v.: fg123, g119, s830,
s916, s631g, s566, s560,
s1012, s1023, s816
FGM_req_rel regional percentage of women who think
that FGM/C is required by religion
DHS, v.: fg122, g118, s1022
b_Men_cont regional percentage of women thinking
that men/their husband believe that
FGM/C should continue
DHS, v.: fg124, s924,
s1024, s817
FGM_rate variable taking value 0 for countries with
no FGM/C, and the yearly average rate
of FGM/C for countries practicing
FGM/C
DHS, v.: see circumcised;
UNICEF Reports (2014)
age age of respondent (r hereafter) DHS, v.: v012
age2 age of r squared DHS, v.: see age
urban dummy variable taking value 1 if the r
lives in a city, 0 otherwise
DHS, v.:v025
education education taking values 0-3. 0 if the r has
no education, 3 if the r has a higher
education level
DHS, v.: v106
Islam dummy variable taking value 1 if the r is
Muslim, 0 otherwise
DHS, v.: v130
ServiceVA service value added as percentage of
GDP
World Development
Indicators (WDI)
IndustryVA industry value added as percentage of
GDP
WDI
ManufactureVA manufacture value added as percentage
of GDP
WDI
AgricultureVA agriculture value added as percentage of
GDP
WDI
GDPpc GDP per capita at constant prices in
US$. Base year: 2005
WDI
Table A.2: List of Variables, Definition and Sources
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Variable Definition Source
LiteracyYF literacy rate of young females (percentage of females aged 15-
24) WDI
LiteracyAF literacy rate of adult females (percentage of females aged 15
and above)
WDI
TertiaryFT percentage of females as teachers in tertiary education WDI
OverallFreedom
index of overall freedom as average of the ten indexes for
economic freedom scaled 0-100 (100=maximum)
Heritage 
Foundation (HF)
FreedomCorr index scaled 0-100 (100=maximum). The score is derived
from transparency International's Corruption Perception
Index (CPI), which measures the level of corruption
HF
PolRights indicator ranging from 1 to 7, 1 represents the most free in
political rights, 7 the least free
Freedom House
CivLiberties indicator ranging from 1 to 7, 1 represents the most free in
civil liberties, 7 the least free
Freedom House
Polity2
index ranging from -10 to 10. -10 indicates that the country is
strongly autocratic, 10 that the country is strongly democratic
PolityIV
PolComp index ranging from 1 to 10 (10=highest). It measures political
competition
PolityIV
PhysIntegrity index constructed from Torture, Extrajudicial killing, Political
Imprisonment and Disappearance indicators. It ranges from 0
to 8. 8 means full government respect for these rights.
CIRI
EmpowerRights
index constructed from the Foreign Movement, Domestic
Movement, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Assembly and
Association, Workers' Rights, Electoral Self-Determination
and Freedom of Religion indicators. It ranges from 0 to 14.
14 means a full government respect for these rights. 
CIRI
FreeAssociation it ranges from 0 to 2. 2 means that the rights of citizens to
assemble freely and to associate with other persons in
political parties, trade unions, cultural organizations or other
special interest groups were unrestricted and freely enjoyed
by pratically all citizens in a given year.
CIRI
WEconRights it ranges from 0 to 3. 3 means that all or nearly all of women's
economic rights were guaranteed by law and the government
fully and vigorously enforces these laws in a given year.
CIRI
WPolRights it ranges from 0 to 3. 3 means that women's political rights
were guaranteed in both law and practice in a given year. 
CIRI
WSocRights it ranges from 0 to 3. 3 means that all or near all of women's
social rights were guaranteed in both law and practice in a
given year. 
CIRI
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Variable Definition Source
trust dummy variable taking value 1 if r thinks that most
of people can be trusted, 0 otherwise World Values
Survey (WVS),
v.: a165;
Afrobarometer 
(Afrob.), v.:
sctrust, q83, q87
trustKnown country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r thinks that most of people (s)he knows
can be trusted, 0 otherwise
Afrob., v.: q84b,
WVS, v.:
G007_33_B 
trustPresident
country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r thinks the Parliament can be trusted, 0
otherwise
Afrob., v.:
trspre, q43a,
q55a, q49a,
q59a
trustParliament country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if the r thinks that the parliament can be
trusted, 0 otherwise
Afrob., v.: q43b,
q55b, q49b,
q59b
trustPolice
country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r thinks the police service can be trusted,
0 otherwise
Afrob., v.: trspol, 
q43b, q55h,
q49g, q59h
trustCourt
country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r thinks that the Court of Law can be
trusted, 0 otherwise
Afrob., v.: trscts,
q43j, q55i,
q49h, q59j
trustElecCommiss
country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r thinks that the Electoral Commission can
be trusted, 0 otherwise
Afrob., v.:trsnec,
q43c, q55c,
q49c, q59c
trustLocalGov country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r thinks that Local Government can be
trusted, 0 otherwise
Afrob., v.: q43e,
q55d, q49d,
q59e
trustRulParty country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r thinks that Ruling Party can be trusted, 0
otherwise
Afrob., v.: q43f,
q55e, q49e,
q59f
MemReligiousGr
country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r is a member of a religious group, 0
otherwise
Afrob., v.:
memrel, q24a,
q28a, q22a,
q25a
MemCommDev
country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r is a member of a local self-help
association, 0 otherwise
Afrob., v:
memdev, q24d,
q28d, q22b,
q25b
AttCommMeet country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r attends meetings of a group that does
things for the community, 0 otherwise
Afrob., v.:
parcom, q25b,
q31a, q23a,
q26a  
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Variable Definition Source
AttDemo country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r has attended a demonstration or protest
march, 0 otherwise
Afrob., v.: pardem,
q25d, q31c, q23c,
q26d
RaiseIssue dummy variable taking value 1 if r has participated
with others to address an important problem
affecting the community or nation (other than
elections), 0 otherwise
Afrob., v.: pariss, q25c, 
q31b, q23b, q26b
ContOfficial country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r, in the past, has contactred a government
or a political party official about some important
problem or to give them his/her views
Afrob., v.: parctg,
q29b, q29c, q32b,
q32c, q25b, q25c,
q30b, q30c
WTreatedUn(emp)country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r thinks that women are deserved an
unequal treatment by employers, 0 otherwise
Afrob., v.: q56e
WTreatedUn 
(courtpol)
country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r thinks that women are deserved an
unequal treatment by the court or the police, 0
otherwise
Afrob., v.: q56d
WTreatedUn 
(leader)
country average based on a dummy variable taking
value 1 if r thinks that women are deserved an
unequal treatment by a leader, 0 otherwise
Afrob., v.: q56c
EmpowerW dummy variable taking value 1 if r thinks that the
present government is handling well with
empowering of women, 0 otherwise
Afrob., v.: q67, q57p,
q65p
EthnicFract index of ethnic fractionalization Alesina et al., 2003
autonomy dummy variable taking value 1 if r's control on
her/his own life is 6 or more on a sclae of 10, 0
otherwise
WVS, v.: a173
localComm dummy variable taking value 1 if the r declares (s)he
feels to be citizen of a local community, 0 otherwise
WVS, v.: G020
age age of r WVS, v.: X003
age of r squared WVS, v.: see age
worldCitizen dummy variable taking value 1 if the r declares (s)he
feels to be citizen of the world, 0 otherwise
WVS, v.: G019
trustOtherN dummy variable taking value 1 if the r declares (s)he
trust individuals from other nations, 0 otherwise
WVS, v.: G007_36_B
trustOtherR dummy variable taking value 1 if the r declares (s)he
trust individuals from other religions, 0 otherwise
WVS, v.: G007_35_B
eudH dummy variable taking value 1 if r has tertiary level
education, 0 otherwise
WVS, v.: X025
eudL dummy variable taking value 1 if r has at most some
degree of compulsory education, 0 otherwise
WVS, v.: X025
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Variable Definition Source
gender dummy variable taking value 1 if r is female, 0
otherwise
WVS, v.: X001
single dummy variable taking value 1 if r is single or never
married, 0 otherwise
WVS, v.: X007
married dummy variable taking value 1 if r is married or
living together, 0 otherwise
WVS, v.: X007
child dummy variable taking value 1 if r has children, 0
otherwise
WVS, v.: X011
CitySize dummy variable taking value 1 if r is living in a city
with more than 100,000 inhabitants, 0 otherwise
WVS, v.: X049
ft dummy variable taking value 1 if r is working full-
time, 0 otherwise
WVS, v.: X028
pt dummy variable taking value 1 if r is working part-
time, 0 otherwise
WVS, v.: X028
self-empl dummy variable taking value 1 if r is self-employed,
0 otherwise
WVS, v.: X028
fgm dummy variable taking value 1 if the country r is
living in practice FGM/C, 0 otherwise
UNICEF reports, 2013 
and 2014
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